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DIVORCE, CUSTODY, GENDER, AND THE 
LIMITS OF LAW: ON DIVIDING THE 
CHILD 
Lee E. Teitelbaum* 
DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUS· 
TODY. By Eleanor E. Maccoby and Robert H. Mnookin. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 1992. Pp. xi, 369. $39.95. 
INTRODUCTION 
What we do not know about divorce and its effects would fill a 
large bookshelf. Dividing the Child, the fortunate collaboration of one 
of this country's finest psychologists, Eleanor Maccoby,1 and one of its 
finest academic lawyers, Robert Mnookin,2 fills an important space on 
that shelf. 
The importance of empirical research on social and economic pat-
terns associated with divorce and child custody cannot easily be over-
stated. We have, for several decades, been engaged in massive social 
experimentation. Divorce, once limited to instances of grave marital 
fault, is now readily available and will affect one half of all those who 
married in 1970.3 As one consequence, approximately one half of all 
the children born to couples married in the 1970s will find themselves 
in unmarried, usually mother-headed, households for at least some 
time, after which, because of remarriage, many will live in yet different 
homes from those they fi.tst knew. Their parents' situation will also 
alter dramatically, with respect to each other and to the children. 
While everyone has assumed that marital dissolution entails signifi-
cant social and economic changes for divorced parents and their chil-
dren, little real knowledge concerning the meaning of those changes 
has informed the various waves of experimentation as they have 
surged through legislative halls. To be sure, social scientists have con-
ducted a few empirical studies. Lenore Weitzman's research on child 
custody and the economic sequelae of divorce4 and the work of Judith 
• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Utah. A.B. 1963; LL.B. 1966, Harvard; LL.M. 
1968, Northwestern. - Ed. I am deeply grateful to Leslie Harris of the University of Oregon, 
Carl Schneider of the University of Michigan, and my colleague Karen Engle for their thoughtful 
and helpful comments on this review. All responsibility for error, of course, is mine alone. 
1. Professor of Psychology, Stanford University. 
2. Samuel Williston Professor of Law, Harvard University. 
3. Andrew Cherlin, The Trends: Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, in THE FAMILY IN TRAN· 
smoN 80, 87 (Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick eds., 5th ed. 1986). 
4. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND 
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W allerstein, Mavis Hetherington, and their colleagues on postdivorce 
parenting and the adjustment of children are perhaps the most famil-
iar examples.5 Necessarily, however, they provide only partial per-
spectives on a large social question: Weitzman's study is primarily 
concerned with outcomes and little with dynamics; Wallerstein and 
Hetherington focus primarily on child adjustment in relatively small 
populations. Maccoby and Mnookin's study, in contrast, deals with a 
large population and provides new information on the patterns of 
parenting that develop from separation through the early postdivorce 
years and on the processes by which those patterns develop. 
I will direct much of this review to Maccoby and Mnookin's find-
ings because they are important. However, a discussion of their re-
search method precedes that summary and analysis, and some 
questions about their interpretation of the data follow. 
Even moderately extensive review of a research method will not be 
everyone's cup of tea. However, that investment seems worthwhile 
because the design of Dividing the Child differs so dramatically from 
much other research in family law and because that difference is im-
portant. The decline of moral discourse in family law observed by 
Carl Schneider 6 parallels a rising emphasis on empirical claims.7 
Commentators on family law now justify its rules, not by declaring 
that they are "right" in themselves according to religious or other 
moral constructs, but by reliance on their instrumental value. Take, 
for example, child custody laws. Until perhaps fifteen years ago, com-
mentators widely agreed that wise policy included a preference for ma-
ternal custody and disfavor or prohibition of joint and divided 
custodial arrangements. 8 Recent explanations for that policy have 
largely been empirical in tone. The importance of continuity of care to 
appropriate child development called for placement of children with 
the parent with whom he had formed the strongest bond. Typically, 
EcoNOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); Lenore J. Weitz-
man & Ruth B. Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child 
Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 473 (1979). 
5. See, e.g., JUDITH s. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, 
WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & 
JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH 
DIVORCE (1980); E. Mavis Hetherington et al., The Aftermath of Divorce, in MOTHER-CHILD, 
FATHER-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 149 (Joseph H. Stevens, Jr. & Marilyn Mathews eds., 1978) 
[hereinafter Hetherington et al., The Aftermath of Divorce]; E. Mavis Hetherington et al., The 
Development of Children in Mother-Headed Families, in THE AMERICAN FAMILY: DYING OR 
DEVELOPING 117 (Howard Hoffman & David Reiss eds., 1978). 
6. Carl Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985). 
7. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse and Family Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 430, 436-37 
(1985). 
8. See 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 496-97 (2d ed. 1987) (maternal preference); see also McCann v. McCann, 173 A. 7 (Md. 
1934) (joint custody). 
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that parent was the mother. This emphasis also justified disfavoring 
joint and divided custody because those arrangements threatened the 
stable living arrangements and emotional ties necessary to the young 
child's development. 
These hypotheses are, of course, plausible on their faces. They 
have, however, fallen out of favor - particularly, as we will see, in 
California9 - and been replaced by contrary or different but equally 
instrumental assumptions. Today, laws privileging maternal custody 
are thought to ignore the contributions fathers can make to child care 
and, by imprisoning mothers in traditional role assignments, to deny 
women the social and economic opportunities enjoyed by men. Joint 
custody is now permitted or formally regarded as preferable in many 
jurisdictions. Io Proponents of this change have denied the importance 
of continuity within a household and urged that shared responsibility 
will encourage both parents to retain significant relationships with 
their children. 
These later claims, like their predecessors, rest on essentially em-
pirical justifications. Valid and reliable social research is essential to 
choosing among rules which claim to do - rather than be - good. 
While some good work has been done, much has been less than excel-
lent and some is very poor. Accordingly, a brief examination of what 
makes Dividing the Child valuable, and the limits associated even with 
good research, is warranted. 
A word about interpretation of the results of this research also 
seems called for. The authors, for good reasons, take the "gendering" 
of custody and other awards upon divorce as a major focus. In doing 
so, they adopt one version of gender equality: a view that emphasizes 
the even distribution of bt.lrdens and particularly of custodial responsi-
bilities and opportunities. In describing the results of Dividing the 
Child, I will follow that approach as well. It is important to note, 
however, that this version of gender equality is not the only way to 
understand that principle. Some feminists argue powerfully that 
equalization of custodial responsibilities is in fact unequal for women 
who have carried out "mothering" responsibilities prior to divorce and 
now find their activities and their commitments ignored or mini-
mized. I I The tension between the two interpretations of gender equity 
will become acute as we go along. 
I. THE R.EsEARCH METHOD 
A. The Research Setting and Focus 
Seemingly inevitably, Maccoby and Mnookin's research was con-
9. See infra section I.A. 
10. E.g., CAL. FAM. CoDE § 3080 (Deering Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE§ 32-717B(4) (1983). 
11. See, e.g., Martha A. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 653 (1992). 
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ducted in California. There are good practical and theoretical reasons 
for their having done so. Both authors were at Stanford when they 
conducted this research, and, as the authors explain, California is 
fairly believed to be "in the vanguard" of divorce law reform (p. 9). It 
adopted the first entirely no-fault divorce law in 1969, rejected the 
traditional preference for maternal custody in 1972, initiated a prefer-
ence for joint parental custody in 1979, and mandated mediation of 
custody disputes in 1981 (p. 9). 
As is true of any reform effort, these modifications sought to rem-
edy evils associated with traditional divorce law. Legislators intended 
to minimize the conflict associated with termination of marital rela-
tions and the reordering of social relations within the family through 
the abandonment of fault-based divorce and the use of mediation for 
custodial issues. They rejected the traditional presumption in favor of 
maternal custody in order to "encourage greater equity between 
mothers and fathers, both with respect to child-rearing and in the 
workplace" (p. 10). Similarly, the policy favoring joint custody seeks 
to engage both parents in caring for their children after divorce on the 
assumption that continued substantial relations with both parents will 
be valuable for children and parents. The interests of children will be 
served by arrangements that do not entail the relegation of one parent, 
usually the father, to the status of a "noncustodian" and risk his es-
trangement. Arrangements that recognize paternal interest and capac-
ity to participate actively in childrearing also serve the interests of 
fathers who wish a continuing relationship with their children and the 
interests of mothers who can escape exclusive child care responsibili-
ties that have the effect of impairing their own professional and per-
sonal development. 
Other less remarkable features of California law point in the same 
direction: most notably, the adoption of specific guidelines, now re-
quired in all jurisdictions, for determining child-support levels.12 
These guidelines seek to provide certainty and thereby minimize con-
flict in the determination of child-support awards and, less clearly, aim 
to provide greater support for children of divorce. 
Many commentators and legislators espouse the goals associated 
with California's reform of divorce law, and some states have adopted 
its strategies, usually in part. If other states follow California's lead -
if it is indeed "in the vanguard" - research in California will provide 
a basis for assessing what reform has wrought and for predicting the 
experiences other states will encounter. Of course, research in this set-
ting, if generalizable, might also provide valuable information to less 
advanced jurisdictions as they consider following California's lead.13 
12. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified in scattered 
sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
13. Under these conditions, it would be ungenerous to regret that virtually all of what we 
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B. The Research Design 
The difficulties of conducting reliable research in connection with 
domestic relations are familiar and well documented. Many studies 
involve small samplesI4 and often specialized populations.Is Well-ed-
ucated white families provide the usual focus for research, I6 and fa-
ther- or joint-custody families rarely appear. Researchers have rarely 
conducted studies of divorced families over time, I 7 nor do they often 
use multiple sources of information about important questions. Is 
Maccoby and Mnookin do not claim to provide the perfect re-
search setting, but their design is far more sophisticated and reliable 
than those of most existing studies.I9 Their choice of design follows 
their belief that divorce is a dynamic process, taking shape over a se-
ries of stages. 
Given this assumption, it is plainly important to collect informa-
tion about divorcing couples at the point of separation, when they di-
vorce, and after divorce. Accordingly, the authors adopted a limited 
longitudinal design, focusing on a cohort: a group of persons similarly 
situated for relevant purposes who will be followed for the research 
period. The cohort for this study included families who had recently 
filed for divorce when the study began. Researchers first interviewed 
the parents making up this cohort shortly after they filed for divorce, 
typically about six months after separation. A second interview took 
place one year later, when many of the divorces had been completed. 
The third interview occurred after two more years had passed, or 
know empirically comes from one state. Weitzman and Wallerstein, perhaps for the same rea· 
sons, also conducted their research in California. It is, however, helpful that Maccoby and 
Mnookin are careful to compare their data with national statistics and with other studies, when 
possible. I will address the question of generalizability below. See infra text accompanying notes 
25-27. 
14. This is notoriously true of, for example, joint custody studies. See, e.g., DEBORAH A. 
LUEPNITZ, CHILD CUSTODY: A STUDY OF FAMILIES AFTER DIVORCE (1982) (18 joint custo· 
dial parents in 11 arrangements); Alice Abarbanel, Shared Parenting After Separation and DI· 
vorce: A Study of Joint Custody, 49 AM. J. 0RTHOPSYCHIATRY 320 (1979) (four families); Susan 
Steinman, The Experience of Children in a Joint-Custody Arrangement: A Report of a Study, 51 
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403 (32 children in 24 families). 
15. Scott and Derdeyn observed that most research on joint custody involved "almost exclu· 
sively middle class parents who were early joint custody enthusiasts and whose agreements were 
self-initiated." Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 
455, 484 (1984); see also PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN 
AND CUsroDY 68-69 (1986) (60 "custodially challenged" mothers who were referred to the au· 
thor, a therapist, by other helping professionals or by other interviewees). 
16. See, e.g., Hetherington et al., The Aftermath of Divorce, supra note 5, at 150 (longitudinal 
study of 48 white, middle-class, divorced parents and matched sample of intact families). 
17. Two notable exceptions are the work of Judith Wallerstein and Mavis Hetherington and 
their associates. See supra note 5 (listing examples). 
18. See, e.g., CHESLER, supra note 15, at 65-68. 
19. Central aspects of the research method are described in an appendix on methods, written 
by Charlene E. Depner. Pp. 308-38. 
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about three and one-half years after separation. 20 
Because this study focused on the process of divorce and custody, 
the cohort only included families with children who would remain mi-
nors for the duration of the study. These families were chosen from 
court records of divorce petitions in two counties and screened for 
eligibility under the criteria described above. Efforts were made to 
reach all of the apparently eligible families: a total of about 2300. 
About 2000 of those ultimately fit the criteria for the cohort. 
Locating families from court record information is notoriously dif-
ficult. Through extensive efforts, the authors located at least one par-
ent in sixty-one percent of the eligible families: a relatively high 
success rate for searches based on court records. They made extensive 
efforts to involve both parents - also a 'notoriously difficult undertak-
ing, but an important one - and enjoyed some success in that enter-
prise. At the time of the first interview, both parents participated in 
forty-four percent of the cases. When only one parent participated, it 
was usually the mother. A few missing mothers and somewhat more 
missing fathers agreed to participate at the last stage of the study. 
Ultimately, the research sample included approximately 1100 fam-
ilies who filed for divorce in San Mateo or Santa Clara County be-
tween September of 1984 and April of 1985 (p. 13). Although there 
was some predictable attrition from the cohort as time went on, the 
authors - again through considerable effort - maintained a very 
high level of participation. 
The families making up the cohort generally resembled national 
sample data21 in a number of respects (pp. 58-70). About the same 
proportion were white22 (88.4% of the research sample; 86.6% nation-
ally); employment rates were almost identical for mothers (about 
84%), as were numbers of children (1.7 in the California sample and 
1.8 nationally). However, the mothers were two years younger than a 
national sample from the same time period. More important, their 
earnings were considerably higher ($18,607, compared with $10,504 in 
the national sample), and the marriages were of shorter duration (10. 7 
years compared with 12.3 years).23 Although comparisons with na-
tional data of divorcing fathers with minor children are not available, 
20. An easier but less satisfactory approach would have been to conduct all of the research at 
one time. The authors would have chosen different groups of families according to the stage of 
divorce at the time of the study - that is, the research group would have included one group of 
parents who had recently separated, a second group of different families who had recently re-
ceived a divorce decree, and a third group who had been divorced for some time. This strategy, 
however, would not ensure that the respondents' changed attitudes and living arrangements re-
sulted from the experience of divorce, rather than from varied legal and social conditions. 
21. The authors cite to the Current Population Survey'conducted in March and April 1986. 
P. 343 n.2. 
22. White includes Hispanics. Eleven percent of the mothers in the California sample were 
Hispanic. 
23. The authors provide only a comparison with a national survey of mothers conducted in 
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the California sample seems better educated and better paid than is 
true generally. The most common salary level for the fathers was 
about $35,000. Only eleven percent of the sample had not finished 
high school, and almost one-third had finished college, often with 
some graduate or professional training. 
The difference between the method employed in this study and 
most others is marked. We have already observed that much empiri-
cal research in family law is based on a small number of instances. In 
addition, research on divorce often employs convenience samples -
clients, friends, volunteers who participate in exchange for free coun-
seling, or members of special interest organizations. 
The difference between these strategies and that followed by Mac-
coby and Mnookin is a difference of kind, not merely of degree. When 
research is limited to a small percentage of a large population, there is 
no reason to believe that whatever one finds in that small group would 
also be true for the relevant population in general. This is even more 
true of convenience samples, which are not only small but, almost in-
evitably, differ in obvious ways from the larger population. Groups 
chosen from therapy clienteles, for example, are likely to overrepresent 
families experiencing serious adjustment problems or those routinely 
relying on mental health professionals in coping with difficulty. Con-
venience groups chosen from special interest organizations, such as 
Dads Against Discrimination, are likely to overrepresent parents who 
have, or feel they have, experienced especially unfair decisions by 
courts or hurtful treatment by former partners. While it may be possi-
ble to say something about the attitudes, experiences, or conduct of 
these subgroups, it is not appropriate to consider them representative 
of the overall divorced population and, therefore, to generalize from 
them to that broader population. 
There are, of course, limitations to the research design for Dividing 
the Child. Many of those limitations flow from the choice of the de-
sign itself and cannot be faulted except on the unfair ground that one 
would have liked a different or a larger study. There are, for example, 
areas of concern about divorce and custody that the study simply does 
not address. Most notably, Maccoby and Mnookin do not examine 
the adjustment of children in the various custodial settings de-
scribed. 24 In addition, their choice of a cohort of parents who have 
already separated and filed legal papers makes it impossible to study 
the separation process itself. 
Even within the design actually chosen, some limitations justify 
1984, which was the starting time for the period during which divorces became final for families 
studied by Maccoby and Mnookin. P. 62. 
24. One of the authors, Eleanor Maccoby, did carry out research on the question of adjust-
ment and particularly the effects of adolescent children's feelings of being caught between their 
parents after divorce. Christy M. Buchanan et al., Caught Between Parents: Adolescents' Experi-
ence in Divorced Homes, 62 CHILD DEV. 1008 (1991). 
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mention. One set of limitations, present in virtually all research, con-
cerns the extent to which one can assume that the sample studied ac-
curately reflects the characteristics of divorcing parents in the counties 
involved. The rate of attrition from the eligible population and the 
lack of information from both parents, while lower than most studies 
have experienced, nonetheless create concern about our capacity to 
generalize even to those who divorce in the counties studied. 
There are, as well, limitations on our ability to generalize from this 
sample to other divorcing and divorced persons, in California or na-
tionally. 25 That the participating sample included a somewhat higher 
proportion of families who preferred shared childrearing responsibili-
ties than was found in a sample of nonparticipants illustrates the first 
concem.26 The high income levels for participating families compared 
to all families in Santa Clara and San Mateo counties, to all California 
families, and to American families overall justifies caution in ex-
tending these findings across California and the nation in a broad and 
unqualified way.27 Indeed, the foregoing combination of factors may 
suggest that, despite the authors' best efforts, the study is most con-
vincing in its implications for the middle class. 
I should also note that it is possible to identify these limitations 
precisely because the authors are detailed and candid about their re-
search design and methods. We can interpret and rely on their find-
ings for exactly the same reasons - reasons that do not exist with 
more casual research strategies. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS 
Summarizing empirical findings is risky business. If the study is 
tightly written - and Dividing the Child is very tightly written - any 
summary will omit some data and findings, usually at the expense of 
context, explanation, and perhaps good manners. However, a review 
that is longer than the original is hardly worthwhile. 
Focusing on the authors' main research questions may mitigate the 
25. In addition, there is no indication of Maccoby and Mnookin's methods for assuring the 
reliability of coding interview responses. This question arises because narrative answers given 
during interviews must be coded into categories for entrance into the database. Some method for 
verifying the consistency with which answers were so coded is customary and desirable. 
26. Recruited families were more likely to have children who lived in both households, to 
have requested joint physical custody, and to have requested joint legal custody than those who 
did not participate. The groups did not differ, however, in the length of their divorce proceed-
ings, in actual dispositions of physical custody, in the incidence of child-support awards, or in the 
amount of child support awarded. Pp. 319-22. 
27. The average income for all sample families at the time of separation was $51,024 (includ-
ing mothers' and fathers' incomes), about $20,000 higher than the average annual earnings for 
families with children under age 18 in the two counties combined, and almost double the average 
earnings of all California families with minor children ($25,540). The national average was 
slightly lower ($23,092). P. 316. 
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risk of criticism. These questions, naturally enough, arise out of the 
legal setting that provided the context for the research. 
One set of questions concerns the amount of conflict involved in 
the resolution of custody, visitation, and economic issues and the ways 
in which the parties resolve these disputes. California law provides a 
particularly valuable setting for this issue because of the centrality of 
dispute reduction to its legal scheme. 
A second set concerns where children live after divorce. California 
law gives this inquiry, central to any study of custody, special empha-
sis by its focus on reducing the gender-based distribution of custodial 
arrangements and by its related policy favoring substantial involve-
ment by both parents in childrearing. 
The third question concerns the stability of initial custody and visi-
tation arrangements and the patterns of adaptation to change over 
time. This issue is obviously important everywhere. Again, however, 
the California legal setting sharpens the inquiry. On the one hand, 
California's emphasis on joint custody rests on an assumption that 
joint responsibility will create a more stable continuing relation be-
tween fathers and their childrep. than did sole custody in one parent. 
On the other hand, there has been some suspicion that formal joint 
custody arrangements will, as a practical matter, dissolve over time 
into what amounts to sole custody, leaving only the formal label in 
place. 
Fourth, reflecting the widespread concern about the feminization 
of poverty and the failure of obligors - almost always fathers - to 
pay child support and alimony, the authors examined financial ar-
rangements reached during the dissolution process. Their concern 
was with the arrangements initially made, the effects of those arrange-
ments on parents and children, and the extent to which family eco-
nomics change over time. 
A fifth question concerns the nature of the postdivorce "co-parent-
ing" relationship: that is, the extent to which and the ways in which 
formerly married parents interact with their children and each other, 
and the practical and economic implications of that interaction. This, 
too, is a question of general concern as well as of interest to a Califor-
nia legal regime that emphasizes "co-parenting" and neutrality toward 
gender. 
A. Conflict and Hostility in Divorce and Custody 
If there is one thing about which virtually everyone interested in 
divorce and custody would agree, it is that this process involves, and 
perhaps creates, the most deeply antagonistic relations suffered by 
humans in modem society. Just that perception accounts for much of 
the current interest in alternative dispute resolution techniques for 
marital dissolutions, particularly custody matters. 
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Remarkably, Maccoby and Mnookin seem to find that the families 
in their sample encountered little legal conflict, or even much heart-
burn, over the custodial and financial terms of their divorce decrees. 
The authors use two sources of information in order to determine the 
level of conflict. As a measure of legal conflict, they reviewed court 
records to determine whether the divorce was contested and, if so, 
whether its resolution required judicial intervention. In addition, they 
asked parents during their interviews to rate the level of hostility felt 
in connection with divorce and its various aspects, including custody, 
visitation, child support, and alimony. 
To nobody's great surprise, Maccoby and Mnookin report that 
levels of legal conflict were low. Three-quarters of the families studied 
experienced little if any conflict over the terms of the divorce decree 
(p. 159). Almost exactly one-half of the 933 cases that had proceeded 
to final decree during the study went uncontested (p. 137), and the 
parties settled another thirty percent through negotiation (p. 137). 
Most of the remaining twenty percent settled after mediation, a 
smaller percentage required a formal custody evaluation, and less than 
four percent went before a judge (p. 137). Only 1.5% of the total cases 
were finally resolved by judicial decree (p. 137). These findings are 
consistent with other evidence that the great majority of custody cases 
are settled by negotiation at some stage. 28 
It is widely believed that, regardless of bow divorce cases are set-
tled formally, the process of dissolution is attended by high levels of 
antagonism, resentment, and injury. If disagreements about the loca-
tion of custody and about capacity to engage in child rearing are sig-
nificant elements of antagonism during divorce, all the ingredients 
seemed to exist in the California sample. Mothers and fathers differed 
greatly in their preferences regarding custody. Eighty-two percent of 
mothers, but only twenty-nine percent of fathers, preferred sole mater-
nal custody (p. 99). Parents also diverged widely in their assessments 
of predivorce participation in child care, which has an obvious bearing 
on their beliefs about commitments to and capacity for child rearing. 
While mothers rated fathers' involvement between 4.5 and 4.8 on a 
10.0 point scale, fathers rated their own involvement between 7.1 and 
7.6 on that scale (p. 82). Nonetheless, reported hostility was remarka-
bly - perhaps for some unbelievably - low. Maccoby and Mnookin 
asked parents during their last interviews - two years after the di-
vorce, on average - to rate the level of hostility associated with the 
divorce on a 10.0-point scale, in which 10.0 was the highest level of 
28. See, e.g., Robert J. Levy, Comment on the Pearson-Thoennes Study and on Mediation, 17 
FAM. L.Q. 525, 530 (1984) ("[S]omething like 85 to 90 percent of divorce cases are settled by the 
spouses and their lawyers prior to trial!"); Marygold S. Melli et al., The Process of Negotiation: 
An Exploratory Investigation in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 1133, 
1142 (1988) (noting that only 32 of 349 cases examined involved a dispute that had to be settled 
by a judge). 
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hostility. The median ratings were astonishingly low: 2.0 for custody 
decisions, 2.5 for visitation issues, 2.5 for child support, 1.0 for spousal 
support, and 3.0 for decisions about the family home (p. 135). Only 
about ten percent of the families gave a very high rating - at or above 
7.5 - for conflict regarding these crucial issues at divorce (p. 136). 
When high levels of legal conflict did exist - that is, when the case 
was settled only by formal mediation, custody evaluation, or court ap-
pearance - the reasons did not lie in demographic variables or even in 
levels offelt hostility. Length of marriage, wealth, and age and race of 
parents were not associated with conflict (p. 148). Expressed hostility 
by a parent had only a slight association with the stage at which the 
dispute was resolved (p. 148). The primary determinants of resort to 
formal methods of dispute resolution had almost entirely to do with 
perceptions of parenting skills: in descending order of salience, the 
father's concern about the child's welfare in the mother's home, the 
mother's concern about the child's welfare in the father's home, and 
discrepant perceptions of each other's preseparation childrearing roles 
(pp. 143-49). Legal conflict over custody resulted, perhaps appropri-
ately, from conflict regarding custodial ability. 
In examining patterns of legal conflict, the authors were aware of 
the widely held hypothesis that mothers purchase favorable resolution 
of custody questions by forgoing adequate property and alimony 
awards. Accordingly, they examined the high conflict cases to see 
whether mothers in those cases received less child support and ali-
mony. No evidence of such trade-offs appeared. Statistical analysis 
revealed no significant relation between conflict over custody and the 
level of either child support alone or total support, including alimony 
(pp. 155-56). The authors suggest that California's adoption of com-
munity-property principles and child-support schedules leaves little 
room for discretion and therefore makes, and is understood to make, 
such negotiating strategies futile (p. 157). 
They did find, however, one disturbing pattern among the high-
conflict cases: a tendency toward using joint physical custody awards 
to resolve serious disputes. It is not that judges ordered joint custody 
in these matters; like most cases, these disputes were resolved by nego-
tiation. Rather, the parents themselves appeared to reach a compro-
mise solution to disputed custodial positions (pp. 151-52). That this 
was only a compromise to end conflict, and not a genuine solution, 
may be inferred from the fact that, in many of the instances when joint 
custody arose from substantial or intense legal conflict, the children in 
fact resided with the mother (pp. 152-53). 
B. Where Do Children Live? 
1. Custodial Arrangements 
Maccoby and Mnookin find, with some surprise, that although 
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California law and social opinion favor shared parental responsibility, 
maternal custody remains the usual arrangement from initial separa-
tion through at least the early postdivorce period. Upon separation 
but before divorce, children resided with their mothers in two-thirds of 
all cases (p. 74). Fifteen percent lived in dual residences,29 and ten 
percent lived primarily with their fathers (p. 74). 
At divorce, the proportion of mothers who received sole physical 
custody was exactly the same as the proportion of mothers whose chil-
dren resided primarily with them during the period of separation. 30 
Joint physical custody awards were slightly more common (20%) than 
had been dual residence at the time of separation (15%), and sole 
physical custody in the father was somewhat less common (8.6% of 
custody awards) (p. 113). At the latest point when the authors col-
lected data, the distribution of residence arrangements remained the 
same as at other times, although these nearly identical percentages 
conceal substantial shifting within the residential groups (pp. 164-68). 
Maccoby and Mnookin's findings are in some respects similar to 
other data on custodial arrangements and in some respects different. 
Census figures from 1980 show a similar rate of residence with fathers 
but also indicate that mothers were the primary custodians in almost 
ninety percent of divorced families.31 The prevalence of dual residence 
and joint custody in the California counties studied plainly accounts 
for the difference in custody arrangements. It is, as the authors ob-
serve, hard to know whether the pattern observed in California reflects 
some change in custodial behavior because no comparable data from 
California at an earlier period exist (p. 73). 
2. Dual Residence and Joint Physical Custody 
The authors' analysis of dual residence and joint physical custody 
is particularly interesting in light of the emphasis on continued rela-
tionships with both parents at divorce expressed in both California 
policy and child-development literature. Some determinants of the 
pattern they found are familiar. For example, some earlier studies 
based on small samples had suggested that for social and economic 
reasons, joint custody would be attractive only to the middle class.32 
Such cooperative arrangements were more likely when the parties 
could relatively easily incur the duplicative costs associated with dual 
29. The authors use the term dual residence to describe an actual living arrangement: when-
ever children spend at least four overnights with each parent during a typical two-week period, 
or at least one-third of their time. They use the term joint physical custody to refer to custody 
decrees recognizing custodial periods for both parents. Joint legal custody means shared deci-
sional responsibility but does not imply anything about the residence of the children. P. 72. 
30. P. 113 fig. 5.3. 
31. FRANK F. FuRSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DlVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT 
HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 32 (1991). 
32. See, e.g., Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 15, at 484-88. 
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residence and when they held "enlightened" views about divorce and 
childrearing - particularly, when they accepted termination of their 
relationship without high levels of anger and resentment and shared 
strong ideological commitments to co-parenting.33 
Maccoby and Mnookin's research partly confirms that research, 
finding that, on average, dual-residence parents were better educated 
and wealthier than those whose children lived primarily with their 
mothers. However, their study, drawing on a much larger sample, 
provides not only greater confidence about previously accepted as-
sumptions but also a sense of nuance that earlier work lacked. 
Despite the overrepresentation of wealthier and better-educated 
parents in dual-residence families, Maccoby and Mnookin found dual 
living arrangements in a broader range of families than other research 
might suggest. They also provide some information about determi-
nants of dual physical custody other than wealth. 
To begin, parents established dual-residence arrangements even 
when they did not share a healthy - that is to say, nonhostile - view 
of their divorces and their partners. Mothers' ratings of the "hostil-
ity" of their divorces were only somewhat (although significantly) 
lower on average in cases of dual residence than when children were 
living in one home, and fathers' hostility ratings were identical (p. 87). 
In addition, while fewer parents who rated their hostility at very high 
levels settled on dual residence, there were nonetheless many instances 
of high levels of hostility in the dual-residence families (pp. 86-92). 
Moreover, dual residence was not exclusively reserved for parents 
with a shared ideological commitment to continuing joint parenthood. 
While both parents were typically strongly committed to healthy rela-
tions with their children, dual-residence families usually occurred 
when fathers insisted on sharing time more equally than mothers 
would have wished (p. 93). 
As one might expect, the age of children also played a role in ini-
tial living arrangements. Dual residence at the initial stages was most 
common with children from ages three to eight, and much less com-
mon either with infants or with children in the preteen and teen years 
(pp. 77-78). Gender was also related to custodial arrangements, with 
boys more likely to live in dual residence than girls (p. 77). When 
mothers initiated the end of the marriage, children were more likely to 
live in dual or father residence than when fathers initiated the termina-
tion (p. 95). 
Employment was related to the residence of children in interesting 
and very traditional ways. Mothers who were not employed outside 
the home were, predictably, likely to have the children living with 
them: indeed, more so than were mothers who did work (p. 76). Fa-
33. See, e.g., Barbara Rothberg, Joint Custody: Parental Problems and Satisfactions, 22 FAM. 
PROCESS 43 (1983). 
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thers who were not working, however, were significantly less likely 
than employed fathers to have custody or to share in a dual-residence 
arrangement (p. 76). 
These predivorce living arrangements often resulted in joint cus-
tody decrees when the divorce was complete. Indeed, joint physical 
custody orders were more common than dual-residence arrangements 
had been prior to divorce (pp. 74, 113). However, the "compromise" 
nature of some joint physical custody awards is again evident from the 
actual living patterns. In more than half of the cases with a joint cus-
tody decree, the children did not in fact have dual residence, and, 
when this was so, the children usually lived with their mothers (p. 
166). Nor does it appear that dual-residence arrangements are them-
selves stable. While only nineteen percent of children in mother resi-
dence at the outset of the study were living with their fathers or in 
dual residence, by its end, more than one-half of the children who 
lived initially in dual residence or with their fathers had moved into 
some different residential arrangement within two years after the di-
vorce (pp. 167-70). 
3. Joint Legal Custody 
Dual residence implies, of course, physical care of the child. Joint 
legal custody, by contrast, has no implications of that kind but is con-
cerned with shared responsibility for major decisions affecting the 
child, wherever he resides. This form of shared responsibility plainly 
has become the social an.d legal norm in California. Sixty percent of 
mothers and seventy-five percent of fathers preferred joint legal cus-
tody when interviewed prior to divorce (p. 106). Moreover, custody 
petitions echoed these initial preferences. In the majority of cases in 
which only one parent filed a petition (with the other parent effectively 
accepting the terms of that petition), the request was usually for joint 
legal custody. When both parents filed formal requests, both almost 
always requested joint legal custody (pp. 106-07). Courts generally 
followed these requests with some exceptions (p. 107). Overall, three-
quarters of all awards incorporated joint legal custody (p. 107). 
One-fifth of all decrees (20.2 % ) established both joint physical and 
joint legal custody. Indeed, joint physical and legal custody were 
slightly more frequent than were decrees (18.6%) creating the "tradi-
tional" pattern of sole physical and legal custody in the mother (p. 
113). Nearly one-half of all decrees (48.6%) gave the mother sole 
physical custody while awarding joint legal custody. Sole physical 
custody in the father, combined with joint legal custody, was awarded 
in about seven percent of all cases, and fathers had sole physical and 
legal custody in less than two percent of all cases (p. 113). Four per-
cent of all decrees established other arrangements, such as divided 
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custody.34 
4. Visitation 
If the custodial patterns reported in Dividing the Child are some-
what surprising, the findings regarding visitation, at least in compari-
son with results in other studies, are much more so. Initially - that 
is, about six months after separation - substantial visitation was com-
mon. The authors, I should emphasize, employ a relatively strict no-
tion of what counts as visitation: daytime or overnight visits during 
typical two-week periods during the school year (p. 171). Using that 
definition, they found that children had visitation with their fathers in 
three-quarters of the mother-residence families (p. 171). Overnight 
visitation was the most common arrangement, followed by daytime 
visits and, least frequently, failure of substantial visitation (p. 171). In 
the smaller group of father-residence families, about forty percent of 
the mothers had overnight visitation with their children.35 
At this early point in the divorce process, then, less than twenty 
percent of the children had no significant relationship with their fa-
thers. In all other instances, children were either visiting their fathers 
in a substantial fashion, living with them part of the time, or making 
their primary residence with their fathers. Loss of contact with 
mothers was even more rare, making up only about three percent of 
the families. 
Although these levels of visitation are higher than most would sup-
pose, they might be written off because they were measured so shortly 
after the parents separated. By the end of the study, one would expect 
a substantial drop in visitation by fathers. One would, however, be 
wrong. 
When children lived in dual residence, substantial visitation was 
definitionally the case. But, even when the child lived primarily with 
one parent, substantial visitation with the nonresidential parent con-
tinued to be common. Moreover, visits most commonly involved 
overnight stays. The percentage of fathers whose children visited 
overnight remained relatively constant during the three and one-half 
years from the beginning to the end of the study, and the same is true 
of mothers whose children lived primarily with their fathers (pp. 171-
72). There was some decline in daytime visitations by fathers and con-
sequently an increase in families in which children did not visit with 
their fathers at all.36 Nonetheless, all of the fathers with sole or dual 
residence, and more than sixty percent of the fathers whose children 
34. P. 113 fig. 5.3. Divided custody means the placement of one or more children with one 
parent and placement of the remaining children with the other parent. 
35. P. 171 fig. 8.4. 
36. Pp. 170-72. It is interesting that a different pattern appears for mothers, whose daytime 
visitations actually increased over time. Id. 
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lived with their mothers, maintained very substantial relations with 
their children (p. 171). 
In addition, some of the remaining fathers maintained relation-
ships with their children, although less than substantial as we have 
used that term. Only thirteen percent of the children living with their 
mothers had not seen their fathers within the past year, and only seven 
percent of those living with fathers had not seen their mothers during 
that period (p. 175). 
C. Stability of Living Arrangements 
We have already observed several important aspects related to the 
stability of living arrangements. One is the continued frequency of 
maternal custody; another is the extensive continued contact by chil-
dren with both parents. However, there are shifts and nuances within 
these patterns that are worth noting. 
Although the large majority of families maintained their initial res-
idential arrangements, a substantial amount of change did occur. The 
fact that overall proportions of living arrangements remained stable 
over the period of the study reveals that change was not in one direc-
tion but rather that changes occurred in all directions and, ultimately, 
compensated for each other. 
More than a quarter of the children changed living arrangements 
during the period of the study (pp. 198-99). The most stable arrange-
ment was mother custody. Eighty-four percent of the children who 
lived with their mothers after separation continued to do so at the end 
of the research period (p. 169). Father custody was also relatively sta-
ble, remaining in place for seventy percent of the families that began 
with that arrangement at separation (p. 169). Dual residence was far 
more unstable; only about one-half of the children in dual residence at 
the end of the period had been there throughout. 37 
The major reasons for change ·in living arrangements are diffuse, 
arising from residential moves, new parental relationships, and, to 
some extent, children's choices and parental notions of what was best 
for the children (pp. 200-01). Perhaps more interesting are factors 
that did not account for change. One might have suspected that the 
quality of the relationship between the parents would be associated 
with the likelihood of continued engagement by nonresidential par-
ents, but this did not prove to be the case. One might also expect that, 
as children grew older, they would prefer to spend more time with 
parents of the same gender. No such pattern appeared. Inertia, or 
perhaps continuity, provided the major determinant of residence, and 
only substantial change - a significant residential move, remarriage 
37. Pp. 167-70. However, because this arrangement accounted for the largest group offami-
lies (two·thirds), it was also true that the greatest number of changes were from mother custody 
to dual or father custody. Id. 
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(but only of mothers), and the like - altered living or visitation ar-
rangements (p. 201). 
D. Financial A"angements 
To no one's surprise, child-support awards were almost uniform, 
and fathers were almost uniformly the obligors. Child support was 
ordered in eighty-three percent of the divorce decrees (p. 116). Fa-
thers were ordered to pay child support in almost ninety percent of the 
cases in which the mother had both physical and legal custody and in 
ninety-six percent of the cases in which the mother had physical cus-
tody and the parents shared legal custody (p. 116). Fathers were also 
ordered to pay child support in two-thirds of the cas.es involving joint 
physical and legal custody (p. 116). By contrast, only slightly more 
than one-third of the noncustodial mothers were ordered to pay child 
support and were ordered to do so in only one percent of the substan-
tial number of cases of joint physical custody (p. 116). 
The authors suggest that disparities in parental earnings substan-
tially explain these findings. Those disparities are significant. At the 
time of separation, most mothers worked, but averaged only about 
$16,000 per year (p. 118). The most common income level for fathers, 
by contrast, was almost $35,000 annually (p. 59). 
The levels of earning by the fathers were closely related to child-
support awards and levels. In joint custody cases, the most powerful 
determinants of a child-support award ·were the father's income and 
the number of overnight visits with the father. The greater the income 
and the fewer the overnights, the higher the probability of an award. 
In addition, unemployment by the mother prior to separation added to 
the likelihood of a paternal child-support order. Finally, perhaps be-
cause of guilt, such awards were more likely in the minority of cases in 
which fathers were the moving parties in ending the marriage (pp. 
119-20). 
One should not assume, however, that the effect of these awards 
was to impoverish fathers and enrich mothers and children. In one-
child families, the aw.ard amounted to about eleven percent of the fa-
ther's gross income when the mother had physical and legal custody, 
about nine percent when there was joint legal custody, and about 
seven percent in joint physical custody families (p. 121). When two 
children required support, the percentages of the father's gross income 
rose only to eighteen percent when mothers had sole custody and sev-
enteen percent in cases of maternal physical custody but joint legal 
custody (pp. 120-21). 
The amounts of awards did reflect the variables included in the 
child-support guidelines, but those variables did not determine the 
award to a very great extent For example, while higher income was 
related to higher child-support awards, awards did not increase di-
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rectly with income. As we have seen, lower child-support awards 
were also related to increasing numbers of overnight visits (p. 119). 
Ultimately, subjective factors and discretion played a substantial role 
in fixing child-support awards (p. 123). 
Divorce decrees awarded alimony with surprising frequency. De-
spite the emphasis of California law on gender neutralization, more 
than thirty percent of the California decrees - compared to eight per-
cent of a national sample - included such an award (p. 129). The 
authors do not provide information concerning distribution of these 
awards between mothers and fathers, but it see~s safe. to assume that 
virtually all went to mothers. The variables relevant to alimony 
awards follow both California law and usual practice: length of mar-
riage and relative income (p. 124). Although length of marriage was 
not associated with the likelihood of an alimony award when other 
variables were controlled, duration was relevant to the amount given 
when an award was made. · 
At divorce, the standard of living for both parties declined. How-
ever, the situation of mothers with primary custody was worse than 
that of fathers. Within six months after separation, employed mothers 
earned an average salary of $18,000; their husbands were earning 
$34,000, almost twice as much (p. 127). Almost all of these custodial 
mothers received child support, averaging $300 per month. 38 Remov-
ing this amount from the father and giving it to the mother, the for-
mer's income fell to $30,400 and the mother's rose to $21,600, 
reducing the income gap (p. 128). However, the mother's adjusted 
income supported both herself and her child. · 
In about thirty percent of the divorces, the mother also received 
alimony. The authors do not examine the effect of alimony closely, 
but they suggest that, although those awards were considerable -
$561 per month on average - divorce decrees usually granted spousal 
support in cases of great income disparity, and those awards therefore 
did not substantially affect the overall postseparation discrepancy in 
income (pp. 128-29). In view of the extent of concerns about the rela-
tive financial positions of spouses at divorce and the national debate 
over the justifiability of alimony generally, the failure to examine 
spousal-support awards more carefully is regrettable. 
Establishing child- and spousal-support obligations is one thing; 
compliance and stability are another. Somewhat more California fa-
thers paid child support (seventy-one percent) than was true of a na-
tional sample (sixty-three percent); however, only fifty-two percent of 
each sample paid full child support (p. 129). The initial rate of com-
pliance with alimony orders was lower in California (sixty-two per-
cent) than nationally (seventy percent), as was the rate of payment of 
38. This is the amount received by those mothers who received child support. Pp. 128-29. 
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the entire spousal-support amount. 39 
Over time, these compliance rates changed. The obvious assump-
tion is that they would decline, perhaps dramatically. Again, the data 
are surprising. Full payment of the initial child-support amount 
dropped from about seventy percent to about fifty-seven percent by the 
end of the research period. The good news is that virtually all of that 
decline is in the form of partial compliance rather than total abandon-
ment of responsibility (p. 250). Moreover and importantly, much of 
the increase in noncompliance was in some sense formal - that is, 
there had been, in some fifteen to thirty percent of the sample families, 
an informal modification by the parents of the initial child-support 
level (p. 256). In fact, when such modifications were taken into ac-
count, compliance actually increased from seventy-one percent to sev-
enty-six percent (p. 256). 
What was the effect of these and other changes on the economic 
well-being of divorced parents and their children? To begin, the earn-
ings of divorced and separated women increased substantially. 
Largely due to increased labor force participation and increased hours 
of work for those who had been employed at the time of separation, 
median yearly earnings for mothers who worked outside the home in-
creased by more than a third over the three and one-half years of the 
study, to more than $21,500 annually (p. 259). The median yearly 
earnings of divorced fathers increased somewhat less: by about twenty 
percent following the divorce (p. 259). Almost four years after separa-
tion, they, like their former wives, still fell well below the income level 
of the combined family prior to divorce. 
If we include income transfers from fathers to mothers as well as 
wages, the relative economic well-being of mothers increased some-
what by the end of the study (p. 260). By that time, mothers had 
about two-thirds of the resources available prior to separation and 
about seventy percent of the median income of fathers (pp. 260-62). 
There are, of course, omissions in this calculation. On the one hand, it 
supposes full payment of support by ex-husbands, which we know not 
to be the case. On the other hand, these income figures do not include 
welfare payments, unearned income, and income from other house-
hold members, such as a new live-in partner. The extent to which 
these payments compensate for each other is unknowable. 
Finally, remarriage had an effect on economic well-being. Even 
during the relatively brief research period, twenty-seven percent of the 
mothers and twenty-eight percent of the fathers had remarried (p. 
263). The economic significance of remarriage was dramatic. The em-
ployment rate for remarried women dropped to its predivorce level, 
39. P. 129. Full spousal support was paid in 41.7% of the California cases but in 66.7% of 
the national sample. Id. Complete failure to pay alimony occurred in 28% of the California 
families but only 16% of the national sample. Id. 
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and the family income of remarried women rose dramatically. Indeed, 
mothers seemed to remarry very well: family income, including the 
new spouse's income, not only reached but exceeded by almost fifty 
percent their predivorce resources. Fathers also benefited financially 
from remarriage, but significantly less so, presumably because the in-
come of second wives is lower than the income of second husbands 
and because second wives are more likely to bring additional children 
into the family than are second husbands (p. 263). 
E. Parenting and Co-parenting 
Everyone understands that divorce affects the conduct of parental 
responsibilities in many ways. The relationship of one parent with his 
children is often geographically and socially more distant than before 
separation. The primary custodian also is differently situated. She 
will often work longer hours, or sometimes begin work, outside the 
home and will have less time and energy for children while at home. 
Economic resources are also more strained, especially when the 
mother is the primary custodian. 
It also seems plausible to assume that mothers and fathers will en-
counter different kinds of difficulties if and when they become single 
parents. Dividing the Child found this to be the case, but less so than 
expected. Both sole mothers and sole fathers, and parents whose chil-
dren were in joint residence as well, reported little difficulty in carry-
ing out daily parenting and household responsibilities (p. 245). 
Moreover, most parents said that parenting was now easier than it had 
been (p. 245). When there were differences, they seemed to reflect ef-
forts by each parent to carry out roles that the other had previously 
assumed. Fathers were more likely than mothers to report difficulty in 
supervising their children's activities and school progress; mothers 
were more likely to report difficulty in remaining firm and patient (p. 
245). 
The primary focus of the authors' examination of parenting is on 
co-parenting: the development of the relationship between parents af-
ter separation when the children spend substantial time in both house-
holds. Perhaps contrary to expectation, this group includes a majority 
of the families in the study, as the data on dual residence and substan-
tial visitation indicate. 
The results of the co-parenting study will be worrisome to many. 
The authors conclude that only about one-quarter of the sample fami-
lies worked out an effective form of cooperation (p. 247). In a substan-
tial number of instances, the parents fought over management of their 
children's lives, and, in another substantial number of cases, the par-
ents managed their conflict by disengaging from each other, thereby 
producing a largely uncoordinated strategy of independent (and prob-
ably inconsistent) parenting (p. 247). Only about one-half of the fami-
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lies indicated that they tried to coordinate rules between the 
households, even at the earliest time. 40 Many mothers and fathers 
tended to think that the other parent was too lenient.41 Any pattern of 
mutual support by parents for childrearing decisions had largely dis-
integrated in these families. 
When the co-parenting relationship is examined over time, it ap-
pears that the frequency of cooperative parents increased somewhat, 
while conflicted parenting diminished (p. 248). However, the diminu-
tion of conflict usually resulted, not from more effective cooperation, 
but from greater parental disengagement (p. 236). Further, as time 
went on, parents tended to reduce their efforts to coordinate childrear-
ing rules between the households (p. 248). Interestingly, it did not 
follow that visitation also decreased as a result of diminished parental 
communication. Most likely, both parents simply came to accept 
more easily the variations in different households. 
The authors also found, counterintuitively, that the quality of co-
parenting depended very little on where children lived, particularly at 
later times in the study. Even in dual-residence families, more than 
one-third of the parents were disengaged from each other (p. 238). In 
all residential settings, the same proportions - about one-quarter -
of the families experienced substantial conflict (p. 238). Indeed, it may 
be that dual residence increases conflict in some circumstances, re-
membering that high-conflict families were initially unlikely to ar-
range for dual residence. 
The ages and number of children had something to do with co-
parenting patterns. Parents with older children were predictably more 
likely to be disengaged from each other (p. 239). Family size was also 
related to conflict; indeed, half of the families with three or more chil-
dren suffered conflicted co-parenting (p. 239). 
Initial hostility between the divorcing parents also had something, 
indeed much, to do with co-parenting relations. More particularly, 
the amount of hostility expressed by mothers at the earliest stage bore 
a close relation to co:-parenting patterns at the second interview period 
(p. 240). In those cases in which mothers expressed high levels of hos-
tility shortly after separation, only sixteen percent enjoyed cooperative 
co-parental relations at the next interview (p. 240). The same pattern 
existed at the latest stage (p. 240). It is worth adding that hostility had 
a far more substantial effect on co-parenting relations than did the 
level of legal conflict (p. 242). 
Finally, the authors examined joint physical custody cases, with 
specific concern for the relation between co-parenting styles and the 
40. P. 218 tbl. 9.4. 
41. Forty-three percent of the mothers with primary custody and 40% of the mothers with 
dual residence thought that fathers were too lenient. P. 226. Fifty percent of the fathers with 
custody and 39% of the fathers with dual residence thought mothers were too lenient. P. 226. 
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reasons for choosing joint custody. In the twenty-nine cases in which 
both parents wanted joint custody and for which co-parenting infor-
mation was available at the second interview stage, only about one-
quarter of the co-parenting relationships were described as conflicted 
(p. 243). By contrast, in the small group of seventeen cases in which 
each parent wanted sole custody and joint custody was clearly a com-
promise, the majority of relations were conflicted and only one was 
cooperative (p. 243). .When one parent had wanted sole custody and 
the other joint custody, the results fell in between (p. 243). It is evi-
dent that an award of joint custody does not itself create healthy co-
parenting and may indeed produce very poor relations when that ar-
rangement is not desired. ' · 
III. THE GENDERING OF DIVORCE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 
The gendering of custodial and financial arrangements is one of the 
primary concerns of Dividing the Child. This focus is closely related to 
a second central concern: the effect of legal strategies that seek to 
change long-established social patterns like the distribution of child 
care responsibilities and economic opportunity. 
A. The Effect of Legal Policy 
One of the hardest problems in the sociology of law is determining 
the relation between legal policy and private behavior. It is obviou~ 
that a hypodermic model will not do; the ip.fusion of legal rules does 
not produce specific results. To begin, legal rules are directed to 
courts as much as to community members and, in some views, more 
so. We know, for example, that members of the community - "pri-
vate" actors - often make arrangements according to their own cir-
cumstances and preferences, and t~at those arrangements may have 
little to dQ with the relevant body of formal law. Stewart Macaulay's 
examination of a well-defined and widely followed normative system 
for regulating commercial dealings among businessmen that differeQ. 
considerably from what co'Qrt~ would have decreed under contract 
doctrine is one seminal demonstration of this point.42 
Jn addition, we know that, even when potential legal disputes arise, 
the parties themselves, and not judges, typically resolve the vast ma-
jority of cases. Negotiated settlement cpncludes between ninety and 
ninety-five percent of all legal controversies.43 . 
These general observations apply to domestic relations as well. 
42. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Rela,tions in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
Soc. R.E.v. 55 (1963); see also H. LAURENCE Ross, SETILED OUT OF COURT (1970) (examining 
how insurance companies settle claims arising out of automobile accidents). 
43. See, e.g.. MILTON HERMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECU-
TORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 28 (1977) (criminal cases); Melli et al., supra note 28, 
at 1142; Ross, supra note 42, at 4 (civil matters). · 
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Legal rules only describe very broadly how spouses must deal with 
each other and how parents will raise their children. The intact family 
remains a significant, semiautonomous social institution.44 At divorce, 
a substantial degree of "private ordering" - that is, allocative deci-
sionmaking by the family members themselves - remains possible. In 
families without children, the parties can largely decide questions of 
property distribution and spousal support without substantial judicial 
review and, in some jurisdictions, without any review at all.45 Even 
when issues concerning children are present, Maccoby and Mnookin's 
research clearly demonstrates the frequency of negotiated rather than 
judicial resolution. 46 
Nonetheless, legal policies and legal rules are not extraneous to the 
resolution of even negotiated outcomes. Professor Mnookin, in a 
thoughtful series of articles, argues that negotiation takes place "in the 
shadow of the law"47 - that is, parties bargain in a context influenced 
by legal norms and particularly by the knowledge that law creates cer-
tain entitlements or "endowments" that will be enforced if the dispute 
goes before a judge. For example: 
Two primary endowments are conveyed by the existing divorce laws in 
all states: (1) non-custodial parents have a right to visitation, unless 
they are shown to be unfit; (2) non-custodial parents have an obligation 
to pay child support to custodial parents, within limits based upon need 
and ability to pay. Parents bargain in the knowledge of these two con-
straints; both know that if either tries to abrogate the rights of the other 
in either of these respects, the aggrieved party can go to court with rea-
sonable expectations that his or her rights will be protected. The legal 
rules and case law relating to marital property and alimony may also 
entitle a mother to a determinate share of the husband's assets. In nego-
tiations under these conditions, a rational spouse would never consent to 
a division that left him or her worse off than if he or she insisted on going 
to court. [p. 48] 
Indeed, the shadow of the law should be longer in divorce cases 
than in most other situations. Unlike almost every other kind of civil 
dispute, divorce cases must go before a court for at least formal deter-
mination that grounds for dissolution exist, even if the parties have 
resolved all custodial and defining financial questions through negotia-
tion. This requirement may be merely formal with respect to ending 
44. See generally Lee E. Teitelbaum, Placing the Family in Context, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
801 (1989). 
45. In California, for example, the parties can make an agreement regarding property and 
alimony binding and nonmodifiable, thus avoiding judicial scrutiny at the time of and after the 
divorce. P. 41. 
46. See supra text accompanying note 28. 
47. Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic 
Behavior. 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining 
in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Robert H. Mnookin, 
Divorce Bargaining: The Limits of Private Ordering. 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1015 (1985). 
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the marriage and defining financial arrangements between the spouses, 
but that is not true of child custody and child support. As a matter of 
legal doctrine, parents cannot bind the court by private agreement in 
these respects; the authority to determine whether specific custody, 
visitation, and support provisions are in the child's best interests is 
reserved to judges as a matter of public policy. As a matter of prac-
tice, the California judges dealing with Maccoby and Mnookin's sam-
ple families failed to approve agreed-upon custodial arrangements in 
some twenty percent of the cases (p. 103). 
B. The Agenda of California Divorce Reform 
All laws may cast such a shadow. California law, as Maccoby and 
Mnookin describe it, undertook to do so expressly. California 
lawmakers sought to occupy the cutting edge of gender equality by 
various strategies, many of which were described at the beginning of 
this review.48 They abandoned the traditional presumption in favor of 
maternal custody and, the authors suggest, have "gone beyond formal 
insistence on gender neutrality" by enacting statutes designed to en-
courage continuing relations between children and both parents (p. 9). 
California legislators believed that an emphasis on joint physical cus-
tody, for example, would "empower both parents to share day-to-day 
responsibility for the child's care, and carries with it the idea that after 
divorce the father and mother should have roughly equivalent roles" 
(p. 7). Moreover, California law allows courts to enter a joint custo-
dial order even when one or both parents do not desire such an ar-
rangement. 49 Plainly, involuntary joint physical custody may serve as 
a vehicle for discouraging the traditional assignment of sole maternal 
custody. 
As the introductory remarks noted, 50 the California version is not 
the only possible understanding of gender equality. Indeed, it is incon-
sistent with approaches that seek to recognize commitments actually 
undertaken by women for the care of their children. At least in princi-
ple - and an important principle in Maccoby and Mnookin's inter-
pretation . of the custodial arrangements - California law seems to 
approve or even encourage joint physical custody even when mothers 
have primarily cared for children during marriage, have defined their 
roles in that way, and wish to continue both the responsibility and the 
role they assumed prior to divorce. 
48. See supra section I.A. 
49. P. 9 n.15 (citing CAL. C1v. CODE § 4600.5(b) (West 1983)). This provision differs dra-
matically from the usual view that joint custody should not be ordered over the objection of a 
parent. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 973 (Md. 1986). In 1989, the California Code 
was amended to state that the existing custody standard was not intended to create a preference 
or presumption favoring any particular custodial arrangement. CAL. Crv. CODE § 4600(d) 
(West Supp. 1992). 
50. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
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With respect to financial arrangements, California law also seeks 
gender equality but is less remarkable in doing so. As we have seen,51 
all states have adopted relatively specific child-support guidelines. Al-
imony is also theoretically available to both husbands and wives - a 
principle applicable nationally since the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
1979 that statutory limitation of postdivorce support to wives violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 52 
Finally, California's community property regime recognizes equal 
contribution to and equal interest in all of the income earned, and 
some wealth acquired, after marriage, regardless of which spouse re-
ceives that income. While only nine states and Puerto Rico have 
adopted the community property system, the availability of equitable 
distribution of property in all states reduces the uniqueness of claims 
to equal spousal interest in marital wealth. 
C. The Shadow and the Substance of Gender Neutrality 
What Maccoby and Mnookin find in their California families 
seems hard to reconcile with any simple expectation that California 
law and policy have "ungendered" custody, alimony, and child sup-
port and that the bargains struck by parents, usually with the assist-
ance of lawyers,53 reflect negotiations carried out in the shadow of a 
gender-neutralizing legal scheme. 
The authors find it particularly difficult to explain the inconsis-
tency between the legal context described above and the dominance of 
maternal custody, which characterized seventy percent of the arrange-
ments at all stages of the divorce process (pp. 74, 113). They also find 
a continued acceptance by divorcing parties, and particularly mothers, 
of traditional role assignments (pp. 95-97). 
The primary determinants of child custody in the California sam-
ple include predivorce involvement in childrearing and confidence by 
the parents in their respective interest in, and ability to care for, their 
children. 54 These phenomena follow conventional patterns. Mothers 
51. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
52. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
53. One or both parents were represented by counsel in the divorce proceedings in 80% of 
the sample families. Both parents were represented in nearly half (47%) of the cases. P. 108. 
54. The authors examine and reject one obvious explanation for child custody patterns: that 
mothers simply have more time than fathers to care for children. It was true that mothers who 
did not work for pay outside the home were somewhat more likely to have the children living 
with them than were working mothers; 76% of the unemployed mothers were the primary custo-
dians, compared with 71 % of the employed mothers. P. 76. However, employed mothers also 
typically served as primary custodians. Four-fifths of the mothers with primary custody worked 
outside the home, and most did so full time. P. 77. Of course, it is still true that mothers were 
less likely to work full time than fathers, and thus have more time - if not a great deal of time -
available for children. It also appears, though, that mothers working full time outside the home 
were no less likely to have physical care of the children than mothers who were employed less 
than 40 hours per week, suggesting that simple reliance on availability does not adequately ex-
plain custodial patterns. P. 80. Finally, and perhaps strikingly, those fathers who presumably 
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and fathers generally agreed that mothers had been more involved 
than fathers in childrearing prior to separation, although they dis-
agreed greatly on the degree of father involvement (p. 67). The over-
whelming majority of mothers, more than four-fifths, said shortly after 
separation that they wanted to continue to act as the child's primary 
custodian, and almost all of the mothers who wanted sole custody re-
quested such a decree at the time of divorce (pp. 99-100). The relation 
between predivorce responsibilities and custody decrees is reflected in 
the fact that fathers were likely to receive primary physical custody 
only in families where mothers rated themselves as less involved in 
childrearing than was usual (p. 81). 
Maccoby and Mnookin did find that a surprisingly high percentage 
of fathers interviewed after separation said that they wanted sole or 
joint custody. One-third of the fathers stated at that time that they 
preferred primary physical custody of their children,. and a slightly 
larger group (35%) expressed a desire for joint physical custody (p. 
99). However, while almost all of the mothers (82%) followed their 
initial preferences with formal requests for custody at divorce, only 
slightly more than one-half of all fathers did so (p. 101). Of those 
fathers who petitioned for something other than what they said they 
preferred, the great majority formally requested less physical custody 
(p. 101). 
The authors also found traditional roles expressed in the effects of 
parental views of their spouses' childrearing abilities. Children were 
very unlikely to live with their fathers if their mothers were concerned 
about the fathers' competence to care for them; indeed, children lived 
with their fathers in only three percent of the cases in which mothers 
entertained such doubts (p. 86). By contrast, when fathers expressed 
doubts about their ex-wives, the children nonetheless lived with their 
mothers in fifty-six percent of all cases (pp. 85-86). 
Child-support awards and alimony were clearly gendered. In 
ninety percent of the cases in which mothers had sole physical cus-
tody, fathers were ordered to pay child support (pp. 116-17). When 
children lived with fathers, however, only one-third of the mothers 
had to pay any support, and, in cases of joint physical custody, fathers 
paid child support in more than two-thirds of the cases while mothers 
paid support in only one percent of the cases (pp. 116-17). 
Maccoby and Mnookin conclude that "despite some revolutionary 
changes in the law to eliminate gender stereotypes and to encourage 
greater gender equity, the characteristic roles of mothers and fathers 
remain fundamentally different" (p. 271). This conclusion leads to a 
had the most time to care for children - the unemployed - were least likely to have physical 
custody. Only three of79 unemployed fathers (five percent) were primary custodians, none had 
been "househusbands" before separation, and an even smaller percentage (two percent) partici-
pated in dual custodial arrangements. P. 76. 
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pessimistic assessment of the significance of legal reform in the face of 
"a strong inertial pull - based on social custom rather than law -
toward mother residence" (p. 270). They also conclude that "much 
divorce decision-making takes place outside the law's shadow" (p. 56). 
Divorcing couples seem to maintain quite traditional values concern-
ing parental roles, which they adopt perhaps without discussion and 
even without thought. 
The authors are more encouraged, it should be said, about the ef-
fectiveness of law in the economic sphere. Support guidelines did, 
they believe, affect the amount of support ordered (p. 290). The only 
concern they express relates to the levels of support established by 
those guidelines, not about any "gendered" distribution (pp. 290-91). 
D. Is There Nonetheless Substance to the Shadow of Law? 
Although Maccoby and Mnookin are consistently pessimistic 
about the effects of law on the families they studied, it is possible to 
read their data quite differently. Indeed, the data give reasons for be-
lieving that the California law reform may have been effective in a 
number of its special concerns and that the parents studied by Mac-
coby and Mnookin may have been influenced by their own and their 
attorneys' assumptions about the operation of California divorce law. 
There is, first, a question of degree. Is, for example, the rate of 
maternal custody really so high as to demonstrate that laws seeking 
gender equity - in the California interpretation - have been ineffec-
tive? While Maccoby and Mnookin regard the seventy-percent rate of 
primary maternal custody as high, that is true only against an implicit 
assumption of approximate equalization of custodial responsibilities. 
Certainly the rate of sole maternal custody in the two California coun-
ties is lower than the maternal custody rate reported by the 1980 cen-
sus data, which, as we saw above, found that mothers were sole 
custodians in ninety percent of divorced families. 55 That difference 
does not seem insubstantial, even taking account of the overrepresen-
tation in the California sample of parents who favored shared custo-
dial responsibility. 
Indeed, one can read much of the California sample data as show-
ing real movement toward greater shared responsibility. That a large 
majority of fathers, some seventy percent, expressed initial interest in 
either sole or dual physical custody (p. 99) itself seems to indicate such 
movement. While far fewer fathers than mothers formally sought pri-
mary or dual physical custody, a substantial number did make such a 
request. Joint legal custody, moreover, has become the norm in Cali-
fornia and is so regarded by both mothers and fathers (p. 106). A 
majority of both mothers and fathers wanted joint legal custody from 
55. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
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the outset (p. 106). These desires were likely to be reflected in both 
formal requests and judicial decisions. In two-thirds of the cases in 
which only one party participated formally, the request was usually 
for joint legal custody, and, when both parents made the same request, 
it was almost always for that kind of award (pp. 106-07). Conflicting 
requests with regard to legal custody occurred in only eleven percent 
of all cases (p. 107). 
It might be suggested, although cautiously - because of lack of 
data from an earlier time - that the very high level of commitment to 
joint legal custody, the substantial levels of expressed paternal interest 
in sole or joint physical custody, and the somewhat lower but still sub-
stantial level of requests for sole or dual physical custody by fathers do 
indicate a change in attitudes and behaviors that is influenced by the 
legal context. The chicken-and-egg problem is, of course, obvious, but 
there is no compelling basis for saying that law merely followed, rather 
than participated in shaping, social attitudes. 
Moreover, the extraordinarily low levels of both felt hostility and 
legal conflict may also reflect the effects of divorce reform. This sug-
gestion requires some speculation because, once again, we have no 
base line from an earlier time against which to compare Maccoby and 
Mnookin's data. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of popular supposi-
tion, supported by genuinely horrible stories, suggesting that divorce 
generally, and custody matters particularly, are conducted as wars of 
annihilation. Just that sense accounts in great part for the current 
enthusiasm for alternative dispute resolution and, indeed, for joint 
custody. 
The remarkably low levels of reported hostility in Maccoby and 
Mnookin's sample stand at the opposite pole from general assump-
tions about the experience of divorce. They are so low, indeed, as to 
call for skepticism, but if one credits the data, they justify a guess that 
the California sample has internalized the policy of reduced conflict at 
divorce, at least in what they say about their experiences and perhaps 
in their behavior as well. 
Secondly, Maccoby and Mnookin's critique of the results reached 
by their sample families and their doubts concerning the importance of 
the shadow of the law may take too narrow a focus. The authors em-
phasize heavily one set of values associated with divorce reform in 
California, and their pessimistic interpretation of their data is mea-
sured entirely by success in achieving gender neutrality. However, 
laws and policies rarely embody a single value. By looking so closely 
at one set of values, the authors may not have given full weight to 
other values embodied in the domestic relations law of California and 
other states. 
Perhaps the most important of those other values is continuity in 
caretaking: a value that is expressly recognized at least in California 
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judicial decisions and, in operation, tends to perpetuate childrearing 
practices adopted while the family was intact. The usual formula for 
giving legal effect to the value of continuity within a formally gender-
neutral scheme is to adopt a preference in favor of the "primary care-
taker" - that is, the parent who carried out most childrearing respon-
sibilities prior to separation. Maccoby and Mnookin state that 
California law "does not embody any presumption in favor of primary 
caretakers, though in practice in disputed cases, some weight is un-
doubtedly given to maintaining continuity in the caretaker role" (p. 
81). It is surely true that the California Code creates no such pre-
sumption. However, some California judicial decisions during the 
time of the study plainly indicate a preference, and indeed a very 
strong preference, for parents who acted as primary caretakers before 
the separation, finding such placements to be generally consistent with 
the child's best interests. In Burchard v. Garay, 56 for example, the 
California Supreme Court reversed a trial court custody award for a 
father entered for the following reasons: 
William is financially better off - he has greater job stability, owns his 
own home, and is "better equipped economically . . . to give constant 
care to the minor child and cope with his continuing needs." ... William 
has remarried, and he "and the stepmother can provide constant care for 
the minor child and keep him on a regular schedule without resorting to 
other caretakers"; Ana, on the other hand, must rely upon babysitters 
and day care centers while she works and studies. Finally, the court 
referred to William providing the mother with visitation, an indirect ref-
erence to Ana's unwillingness to permit William visitation. 57 
The trial court also noted that Ana had a history of emotional 
Instability. 
Applying the "best interests" standard, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that all of the factors cited by the trial court together "weigh 
less to our mind than a matter it did not discuss - the importance of 
continuity and stability in custody arrangements."58 The court added: 
All of these grounds ... are insignificant compared to the fact that Ana 
has been the primary caretaker for the child from birth to the date of the 
trial court hearing, that no serious deficiency in her care has been 
proven, and that William, Jr., under her care, has become a happy, 
healthy, well-adjusted child. We have frequently stressed, in this opinion 
and others, the importance of stability and continuity in the life of a 
child, and the harm that may result from disruption of established pat-
terns of care and emotional bonds. The showing made in this case is, we 
believe, wholly insufficient to justify taking the custody of a child from 
the mother who has raised him from birth, successfully coping with the 
many difficulties encountered by single working mothers. 59 
56. 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986). 
57. 724 P.2d at 488. 
58. 724 P.2d at 488. 
59. 724 P.2d at 492-93 (footnote omitted). 
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To be sure, Burchard establishes no formal presumption and holds 
only that the trial court erred in giving substantial weight to the fa-
ther's greater financial capacity and the mother's need to work outside 
the home. Nonetheless, the court's language and its willingness to re-
verse the trial court's decision express a strong preference for custody 
by the primary caretaker, and lawyers could have understood it gener-
ally to confirm the value of continuity in custodial decisions. To the 
extent that mothers more often serve as primary caretakers and that 
parents and their lawyers assume that maternal claims will be so heav-
ily favored, one would expect just the pattern found by Maccoby and 
Mnookin. One would, moreover, expect many of the details of that 
pattern, including the abandonment by fathers of preferences for sole 
or joint custody, when it is clear that the mother had been and wished 
to remain the primary caretaker. 60 
If this analysis is right, it sheds considerable light on the operation 
of the primary caretaker presumption in California and, perhaps, else-
where. Preference for primary caretakers has sometimes been criti-
cized as reinventing the presumption favoring maternal custody, while 
maintaining the appearance of gender neutrality. That is one way to 
read the data in Dividing the Child. So understood, it is possible to 
find a fundamental contradiction in a policy that seeks to value both 
gender neutrality, including shared responsibility, and continuity of 
child care. 
It should also be said, however, that the primary caretaker pre-
sumption operates to confirm maternal custody because mothers and 
fathers continue to allocate cQ.ildrearing responsibilities in "tradi-
tional" ways during marriage and themselves value continuity of child 
care. The presumption only becomes operational after childrearing 
patterns have existed, in many instances, for a number of years.61 A 
divorce decree could only overcome the effects of the maternal prefer-
ence on those preexisting patterns by imposing dual custody. 
60. Indeed, one could make a case that parties were more influenced by the shadow of the 
law than were some trial courts, who often seemed to follow highly traditional approaches to 
divorce cases. For example, it was quite clear that trial judges were far more suspicious about 
fathers' requests for sole custody than about those by mothers. When the only request was for 
mother custody, that award was made in 90% of the cases. P. 103. When the only request was 
for father custody, that award followed in only 75% of the cases, with the remainder equally 
divided between mother custody and some other arrangement. Courts examined closely even 
common requests for joint physical custody. P. 103. Almost half of such requests were denied, 
and, of those that were denied, mothers were four times more likely to be awarded sole physical 
custody than were fathers. P. 103. While the authors do not correlate these results with predi-
vorce child care patterns, rates of greater mother involvement are so high that judicial departures 
from requests may well indicate efforts by parents to depart from prior caretaking roles under 
circumstances that encounter judicial resistance. 
61. The average age of the oldest child at the latest interview stage was 7.2 years for partici-
pating families. P. 324. Because the last interviews occurred about three and one-half years after 
separation and filing for divorce, an average of somewhat less than four years of child care 
elapsed before that point. 
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Although Maccoby and Mnookin believe that result to be consistent 
with California custody law, both the Garay decision and subsequent 
legislative action cast doubt on that interpretation. Further, as their 
own data clearly suggest, such a solution carries with it great cost to 
continuity of child care, considerable initial cost to mothers who wish 
continuity in their own roles, and substantial risks of hostility and 
frustration in the subsequent co-parenting relationship - conse-
quences that the parties may have foreseen. 
This is not to say that Dividing the Child does not reveal gendered 
patterns in the decisions of both parents and courts. It is to say that 
the patterns the authors find do not necessarily demonstrate the fail-
ure, or irrelevance, of California divorce policy. Those patterns reflect 
gendered living arrangements established by the spouses long before 
the divorce. Perhaps it would be better if other patterns existed. 
However, a body of law that takes effect only after partners have es-
tablished living patterns and that is rarely contemplated during the 
marriage cannot be regarded as ineffective because it does not change 
behavior that occurs prior to the occasion for its use. 
Nor does Dividing the Child strongly demonstrate that bargaining 
in the shadow of the law does not characterize marital dissolutions 
and custodial decisions. There is evidence that the legal context may 
have strongly influenced the incidence of joint physical custody and, 
even more strongly, of joint legal custody. It may also have some ef-
fect on the level of continued contact with the child by both parents, 
which is far higher than that reported in other studies. Most impor-
tantly, one can even understand the dominance of maternal custody as 
bargaining within the shadow of a law that is multivalent, seeking si-
multaneously to place great value on continuity in child care and on 
shared responsibility. 
Finally, one cannot avoid wondering about the view of gender neu-
trality posited by Maccoby and Mnookin. If California law assumed 
that, whatever their predivorce arrangements, children would be di-
vided equally between father and mother custody or would reside in 
joint physical custody, such a policy would require considerable and 
often undesired sacrifice by women and children in the service of some 
long-run and speculative goal of changed behavior during marriage. 
This is not a Solomonic solution - Solomon's wisdom, after all, lay in 
the fact that he did not divide the child. 
CONCLUSION 
Dividing the Child is only one entry on a shelf that needs filling. 
Many other volumes should accompany it. Some will report research 
at earlier and later stages of the divorce process than the period ex-
amined by Professors Maccoby and Mnookin. Others will study 
populations different from the cohort followed in Dividing the Child. 
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Large-scale research concerning the lawyers who routinely advise di-
vorcing spouses and thus participate substantially in the dissolution 
process is important, as is closer examination of the financial arrange-
ments associated with divorce. Further study of the effects of various 
custodial situations on the long-term adjustments of children also re-
mains an important enterprise. 
The need for these additional volumes does not, however, detract 
from the appreciation we owe Maccoby and Mnookin for their contri-
bution to our knowledge. Empirical research of this scope and quality 
is rarely done, not only because it requires technical skill, but because 
it is far longer, harder, and more expensive than traditional legal re-
search or more informal kinds of empiricism. The contribution of Di-
viding the Child goes beyond what it tells us about the process of 
determining custody, visitation, and financial support in the context of 
the California divorce law reform; it provides an example of how the 
remaining work might be done. 
